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Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Canada

Action 20 of the action plan set out in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons calls on States parties to submit regular reports on their implementation of the action plan, as well as of the 13 practical steps towards disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". Canada submits the present report to further fulfil these commitments. This report updates the information provided in the reports submitted by Canada to the Preparatory Committee at its sessions held in 2012 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/10), 2013 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/9), 2014 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/8 and NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/9) and 2017 (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/10) and to the Review Conference in 2015 (NPT/CONF.2015/34).

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*

Nuclear disarmament

1 Canada's international security policy continues to promote non-proliferation and a progressive, step-by-step process towards the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, consistent with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) obligations and in a manner that promotes strategic stability for all.

Canada promotes this policy with its allies and partners in NATO, the Group of Seven (G7), the Francophonie, the Organization of American States, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, among others.

2 Canada continues to promote the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in the implementation of Treaty obligations, most notably through co-sponsorship of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative joint working paper entitled "Proposals by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to enhance transparency for

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Action	Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017
	strengthening the review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.26). Canada voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 72/50, entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", which emphasized the importance of applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency to the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Canada welcomed the adoption without a vote of General Assembly decision 72/514, entitled "Nuclear disarmament verification".
3	Not applicable
4	Not applicable
5	Not applicable
6	Canada continues to support the creation of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament as part of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work. Canada engaged constructively in the working group on the "way ahead" established by the Conference on Disarmament (CD/2090) in 2017 to advance discussions on disarmament issues, including nuclear disarmament.
7	Canada continues to support the creation of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to address effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as part of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work. Canada engaged constructively in the Conference on Disarmament working group on the "way ahead" (CD/2090) in 2017 to address multiple disarmament issues, including general nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cut-off treaty and negative security assurances.
8	Not applicable
9	Canada supports the convening of a conference on a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction to be attended by all States in the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. Canada joined the consensus on General Assembly resolution 72/24, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East", and resolution 72/22, entitled "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty"; Canada voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 72/45, entitled "Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas".
10	Not applicable
11	Canada signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 2 December 1998. Canada's Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Implementation Act is being implemented provisionally pending the Treaty's entry into force.
12	Canada provides annual updates on its efforts to promote the entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty for inclusion in the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
13	Canada participated in the Article XIV Conference on 20 September 2017, co-chaired by Belgium and Iraq, and supported the Conference's final declaration, which, inter alia, called for concrete and actionable steps towards early entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Canada co-sponsored and voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 72/70, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty". Canada also co-sponsored Security Council resolution 2310 (2016), which, inter alia, called for the Treaty's early entry into force and for all States to maintain voluntary moratoriums on nuclear test explosions.
14	All of the 16 stations and laboratories hosted by Canada as a part of the International Monitoring System for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty have been completed and certified by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. In February 2017, Canada hosted a cold-weather airborne field test in Ottawa that involved the use of airborne radiation detection equipment contributed by Canada to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in September 2013. In December 2017, Canada's weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme and Kazakhstan signed a memorandum of understanding to fund the development of a cooperating national facility monitoring station in Kazakhstan that will help the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to detect nuclear explosions.
15	Canada has actively called for the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the Conference on Disarmament or in another international forum. Nominated by the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 71/259, Canada is chairing the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group in 2017–2018 to make recommendations on substantial elements of a future treaty. In July and August 2017, Canada chaired the first two-week session of the preparatory group in Geneva. As part of this two-year process, in February 2018, Canada also chaired a second informal consultative meeting in New York, open to all States Members of the United Nations, to share views and discuss interactively the work of the preparatory group. At the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, Canada co-sponsored Assembly decision 72/513 on the fissile material cut-off treaty.
16	Not applicable
17	Canada continues to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure that surplus fissile material no longer required for military purposes is irreversibly removed (applicable only to nuclear-weapon States).
18	In conformity with its legal obligations through its comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), arising from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and as verified by regular IAEA inspections, Canada does not operate any facility that produces fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
19	Canada participates actively in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, including all four plenaries to date, and is represented in each of the three working groups. Canada also engages in the intersessional meetings of the working groups and is contributing to discussion papers. Canada supported resolution 71/67 on nuclear disarmament verification, adopted by the General Assembly at its seventy-first session, to create in 2018–2019 a Group of Governmental Experts on nuclear disarmament verification. Canada is providing funding through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to support the efforts of the Nuclear Threat Initiative to serve as secretariat of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.
20	
21	Canada endorses the draft reporting form of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative for all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a template for providing greater transparency on nuclear disarmament activities by the nuclear-weapon States. This form was submitted at the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee as a part of working paper NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17. Further recommendations concerning reporting by the nuclear-weapon States were put forward in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative joint working paper entitled "Proposals by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to enhance transparency for strengthening the review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.26).
22	The International Security Research and Outreach Programme of Global Affairs Canada, in partnership with The Simons Foundation Canada, continues to support the enhancement of Canadian graduate-level scholarships on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues. Four scholarships (totalling $20,000) are awarded annually, with $325,000 having been distributed since the programme's inception in 2003. On 20 April 2018, Global Affairs Canada held consultations with experts from Canadian civil society organizations and academia to promote transparency, openness and education on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation issues.
Nuclear non-proliferation	
23	Canada continues to call upon States that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.
24	Canada's comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA has been in place since 21 February 1972. Canada's additional protocol with IAEA has been in place since 8 September 2000.
25	Canada continues to urge all States that have not yet done so to complete and implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol with IAEA, which we consider is the verification standard pursuant to article III of the Treaty. Within the context of IAEA, during negotiations of the resolution on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards, Canada, in cooperation with other countries, resisted attempts to revise language that would eliminate the call for universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
26	Since 2005, IAEA has concluded on an annual basis that all nuclear material in Canada remains in peaceful purposes. This broader conclusion pursuant to Canada's comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol provides the highest level of confidence that Canada is in compliance with its non-proliferation commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
27	Canada welcomes the ongoing implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which provides a framework to establish confidence that the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran are peaceful in nature through monitoring and verification by IAEA. To date, Canada has contributed $11.5 million to support IAEA efforts to monitor and verify the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and its predecessor, the Joint Plan of Action. At the IAEA General Conference and IAEA Board of Governors meetings in 2015 and every subsequent year, Canada reiterated its condemnation of the illicit nuclear weapons development programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including nuclear testing, the production of fissile material, both enriched uranium enrichment and separated plutonium, and ballistic missile testing. Canada continues to call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with all relevant Security Council resolutions, return to compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with its safeguards agreement with IAEA, and fulfil its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. At the IAEA General Conference and IAEA Board of Governors meetings in 2015 and every subsequent year, Canada also called on the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate fully with the Agency to resolve all outstanding issues regarding its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, particularly with regard to the Dayr al-Zawr site and other functionally-related sites identified by IAEA.
28	Canada's additional protocol with IAEA was signed on 24 September 1998 and entered into force on 8 September 2000.
29	Canada continues to support the G7 initiative to make diplomatic representations to advance the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol thereto.
30	Not applicable
31	Not applicable
32	Canada welcomes IAEA efforts to apply the State-level concept to all States with a safeguards agreement in force, as part of the continuing evolution of safeguards implementation necessary to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. We look forward to the next report by the IAEA Director General, which will outline the Agency's experience in implementing updated State-level approaches.
33	Canada paid its 2018 assessed contribution to the IAEA regular budget and its voluntary assessed contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund on time and in full, in line with our sustained efforts towards timely and predictable payments.
34	Through the Canadian Safeguards Support Programme, Canada contributes to the research, development and support of safeguards equipment and techniques for both domestic and international use aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
35	Canada is a member of and an active participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee and the Wassenaar Arrangement and implements their commitments through a national export control system and nuclear cooperation agreements. In 2016, Canada submitted an updated national implementation action plan to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and regularly advocates for and calls on other nations to fulfil their reporting and action plan obligations in relation to resolution 1540 (2004). On 28 June 2017, Canada participated in Security Council open debates on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and called for the full and universal implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).
36	Canada's export control system is consistent with the lists of multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms in which it participates. Canada supports the IAEA technical cooperation programme, as outlined in section 56.
37	Canada's national export control system ensures that exports of controlled goods and technology, including nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items, are not authorized where the proposed export would be inconsistent with Canada's foreign and defence policy (including where there is deemed to be an unacceptable risk of diversion to a weapons of mass destruction programme or to an unsafeguarded facility, or when an export would be otherwise contrary to Canada's non-proliferation policy and international commitments and obligations).
38	Canada has 30 nuclear cooperation agreements in place with 48 States, including developing countries, to facilitate mutually beneficial exchanges for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy requires that all prospective nuclear partners, including both non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States, must agree to — and conclude — a binding nuclear cooperation agreement before cooperation can commence. Nuclear cooperation agreements commit Canada's nuclear partners to comply with a set of non-proliferation policy requirements, notably that Canadian nuclear exports would be used only for peaceful, non-explosive end uses. Other requirements include prior consent for the high enrichment of uranium, reprocessing of spent fuel or retransfer of Canadian-supplied items to third countries; adequate physical protection; and provision for bilateral "fall back" safeguards in the event that the IAEA safeguards system becomes immobilized. All provisions are fully reciprocal. Nuclear cooperation agreements are required before exports of nuclear material, equipment or technology can take place.
39	Cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country, as well as their implementation of nuclear safety standards and nuclear security guidance and recommendations.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
40	Canada maintains the highest level of effective physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities at the domestic level through a robust regulatory framework that integrates relevant safety, security and safeguard elements, the implementation of strong physical protection measures and an industry that fully understands and fulfils its responsibilities. This is reinforced by close cooperation on nuclear security issues between the regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, federal and provincial law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the industry, foreign Governments and international organizations. Canada was pleased to be the President of the IAEA International Conference on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, held from 13 to 17 November 2017, wherein IAEA member States took stock of measures to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced over Can$42 million for projects between 2016 and 2018 through Canada's weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to enhance nuclear and radiological security worldwide. These projects include funding for bilateral projects to combat illicit trafficking, improve physical protection of nuclear facilities, promote safe management and disposal of radioactive sources and improve transportation security. The projects also include funding for international organizations and initiatives, including the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
41	Consistent with the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, Canada maintains strong physical protection measures for its nuclear materials, including armed on-site response forces, constant threat monitoring, enhanced security screening, a comprehensive drill and exercise programme and robust perimeter protection. Physical protection in Canada is strengthened by a rigorous nuclear material accounting system that tracks nuclear materials, in line with Canada's international commitments.
42	Canada ratified the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in December 2013 and welcomed its entry into force on 8 May 2016. Canada also supported a series of workshops aimed at promoting the ratification and implementation of the Convention and its 2005 amendment to countries that had not yet done so. In March 2018, Canada supported a two-day workshop organized by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) aimed at over 30 countries that are not yet signatories to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 amendment in order to advance universalization of those treaties. Through the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Canada is also working on enhancing legislative frameworks to help countries with the implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 amendment (see section 44 below for more details).
43	Canada remains committed to the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources, approved in September 2017. Canada provided funding to IAEA through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to allow approximately 40 experts from Latin America and Africa to attend the fifth International Conference on the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, held in Vienna in June 2017.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
44	See action 40 regarding assistance to States parties with a view to strengthening national capabilities against illicit trafficking of nuclear material. Canada is an endorser of the Proliferation Security Initiative and an active member of its Operational Experts Group and chaired the Critical Capabilities and Practices Review Team from 2016 to mid-2018. In June 2017, Canadian Armed Forces personnel deployed to the Caribbean to take part in Exercise Tradewinds, during which Canada partnered with Trinidad and Tobago to develop counter-proliferation capacities simulating the interdiction of a merchant ship suspected of carrying illegal weapons of mass destruction-related materials. In June 2017, Canada became the Chair of the Nuclear Forensics Working Group of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which aims to enhance partner countries' nuclear forensics capabilities in order to improve material accountancy and investigations into material out of regulatory control, including trafficked materials. Canada also provided assistance through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to remove high activity disused sealed radioactive sources from South America; to enhance regulatory frameworks for nuclear security in African States; to strengthen nuclear security in Ukraine; to support the INTERPOL subdirectorate for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials and capacity-building activities in Latin America and South-East Asia; and to strengthen border security, counter nuclear smuggling and build critical incident response capacity in Jordan.
45	Canada ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in November 2013. Fulfilling an action item in the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit action plan in support of the United Nations, Canada co-hosted with UNODC an event celebrating the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on 5 December 2017. States parties met to take stock of implementation efforts to date and to identify areas of complementarity between the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. This event aimed to help States parties with implementation efforts and to raise awareness among States that have yet to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. In December 2017, Canada organized an event to mark the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in cooperation with UNODC to further the effective implementation of the Convention within States parties and to encourage signatories and non-signatories to advance their efforts towards ratification or accession. The Co-Chairs' summary of the event was circulated to IAEA member States as IAEA information circular INFCIRC/924 on 2 March 2018.
46	The technical capabilities of a country's system and the nature and the scope of cooperation between that system and IAEA are two of the State-specific factors that IAEA considers when developing a State-level approach to safeguards. Canada continues to work with IAEA to implement the updated State-level approach for Canada.
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy	
47	Canada possesses an indigenous nuclear power reactor system and a broad and diverse nuclear sector, and is a reliable supplier of uranium, nuclear equipment and technology, and radioisotopes.
48	Canada has 30 nuclear cooperation agreements in place covering 48 States, in addition to a wide range of memorandums of understanding facilitating increased cooperation with partner countries and institutions.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
49	Canada provides experts, equipment and technology to many developing States parties through technical cooperation. Canada has nuclear cooperation agreements in place with many developing countries. Cooperation has included exports of nuclear power reactors, nuclear material and equipment. Canada provided $2.3 million to support the IAEA Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratory (ReNuAL) project in 2016. We also provide expertise to support IAEA technical cooperation activities and regularly host related events in Canada, including in 2018. Additionally, through the weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme, Canada provides over $30 million per year in capacity-building projects that enhance nuclear and radiological security worldwide, particularly in developing areas of the world, which has the effect of enhancing the accessibility of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
50	See action 49 for information on Canada's nuclear cooperation with developing countries.
51	See actions 38 and 39 for information on Canada's nuclear cooperation.
52	In the context of the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee, the Board of Governors and General Conference, Canada regularly proposes initiatives to improve the governance and management of the Technical Cooperation Programme, including: greater strategic management of the Programme; encouraging IAEA member States to pay their voluntary assessed contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund in full and on time; encouraging countries in a position to do so to contribute to funding their own technical cooperation projects through the government cost-sharing mechanism rather than drawing from the Technical Cooperation Fund; and encouraging the implementation of outcome monitoring for all technical cooperation projects.
53	Canada is continuing long-standing efforts to improve governance and management of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund through the IAEA policymaking organs and relevant working groups. Despite some progress in recent years, additional work remains to be done in the areas of strategic management, outcome monitoring, which countries draw on the Fund and member State payment of contributions to the Fund. Canada will continue to engage IAEA member States to encourage positive changes in these areas.
54	See action 33 for information on Canada's contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund.
55	Canada contributed $3.2 million via the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative in 2016–2018 and provided in-kind resources to Peaceful Uses Initiative projects.
56	Canada is an active and regular contributor of support and expertise to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. Canada has hosted fellowship participants and scientific visitors from the Americas, Asia, Africa and Europe and hosted Technical Cooperation Programme meetings in the areas of nuclear safety and regulatory activities. Canadian lecturers and experts have contributed technical training in the areas of human health, agriculture and food security, water and the environment, energy, radiation technology and security and safety.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
57	See actions 24, 28 and 42 for information on comprehensive safeguards agreements, the additional protocol and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Nuclear Energy Act of 1985 (amended in 1997) relates to the development and utilization of nuclear energy in Canada. The Nuclear Safety and Control Act came into force in May 2000, replacing the Atomic Energy Control Act. It established the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission as the national regulator and set out its mandate, responsibilities and powers. These include domestically regulating the development, production and use of nuclear energy and materials to protect health, safety, security and the environment and to implement Canada's international commitments to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
58	Canada supported the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors in December 2010 to establish an IAEA low enriched uranium bank, welcomes the progress made to date in establishing the bank and bringing it towards operation and will continue to assess proposed fuel assurance mechanisms based on their individual merits.
59	Canada ratified the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident in January 1990. Canada ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety in December 1995. Canada ratified Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management in May 1998. Canada ratified the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency in August 2002. See actions 42 and 45 for more information on the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Canada had ratified both instruments as of December 2013.
60	Canada is providing funding through its weapons of mass destruction threat reduction programme to the World Institute for Nuclear Security to develop a nuclear security support centre in Mexico that will provide the Central American region with additional support in enhancing nuclear security, including through the provision of certified training. Canada continues to provide in-kind support to IAEA for the development of IAEA safety standards and IAEA Nuclear Security Series documents. Canada actively participates in the review meetings of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and presided over the 2017 Convention on Nuclear Safety review meeting. Canada has included engagement with the nuclear industry and the private sector on nuclear safety and security as a main theme of its G7 presidency in 2018 in the context of the Nuclear Safety and Security Group. Furthermore, as the inaugural convener of the Nuclear Security Contact Group in 2016–2017, Canada engaged closely with the Nuclear Industry Steering Group for Security in order to leverage the important and unique role that nuclear industry operators play in implementing nuclear security obligations.

Action	*Steps taken to implement commitments since May 2017*
61	Canada is making good progress on its initiatives to reduce stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU), including by repatriating HEU to the United States of America, in accordance with previous Nuclear Security Summit commitments to repatriate HEU spent fuel originating from the United States in 2010 and HEU liquid in 2012. At the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, leaders agreed to continue minimizing the use of HEU in the production of medical isotopes, and in October 2016 Canada ceased routine production of the medical isotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) at the National Research Universal reactor. From November 2016 to March 2018, the reactor will remain in "hot standby" mode to produce isotopes as an "international supplier of last resort" in the event of a prolonged and unforecasted global shortage that cannot otherwise be mitigated. After March 2018, the reactor will be decommissioned and HEU repatriated to the United States. Consistent with its Nuclear Security Summit commitments, Canada is also decommissioning an HEU-fuelled research reactor at the University of Alberta. Canada will be participating in the International Symposium on HEU Minimization and Elimination, to be hosted by Norway in 2018, in order to take stock of international minimization and elimination efforts to date and to share updates on minimization efforts.
62	Canadian transport regulations for radioactive materials are based on the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material.
63	On 1 January 2017, the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act entered into force. Canada ratified the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage in June 2017.
64	Canada notes and reaffirms the consensus reached at the fifty-third session of the IAEA General Conference that any armed attack on and threat against safeguarded nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the IAEA statute.